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Background: This paper documents and analyses some of the responses to the largest Ebola outbreak on record,
which took place in Uganda between September 2000 and February 2001. Four hundred and twenty five people
developed clinical symptoms in three geographically distinct parts of the country (Gulu, Masindi, and Mbarara), of
whom 224 (53%) died. Given the focus of previous social scientific Ebola research on experiences in communities
that have been directly affected, this article expands the lens to include responses to the outbreak in local, national,
and international contexts over the course of the outbreak.
Methods: Responses to the outbreak were gauged through the articles, editorials, cartoons, and letters that were
published in the country’s two main English language daily national newspapers: the New Vision and the Monitor
(now the Daily Monitor). All the relevant pieces from these two sources over the course of the epidemic were cut
out, entered onto a computer, and the originals filed. The three a priori codes, based on the local, national, and
international levels, were expanded into six, to include issues that emerged inductively during analysis. The data
within each code were subsequently worked into coherent, chronological narratives.
Results: A total of 639 cuttings were included in the analysis. Strong and varied responses to the outbreak were
identified from across the globe. These included, among others: confusion, anger, and serious stigma in affected
communities; medical staff working themselves to exhaustion, with some quitting their posts; patients fleeing from
hospitals; calls on spiritual forces for protection against infection; a well-coordinated national control strategy; and
the imposition of some international travel restrictions. Responses varied both quantitatively and qualitatively
according to the level (i.e. local, national, or international) at which they were manifested.
Conclusions: The Ugandan experience of 2000/2001 demonstrates that responses to an Ebola outbreak can be
very dramatic, but perhaps disproportionate to the actual danger presented. An important objective for any future
outbreak control strategy must be to prevent excessive fear, which, it is expected, would reduce stigma and other
negative outcomes. To this end, the value of openness in the provision of public information, and critically, of
being seen to be open, cannot be overstated.
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The gruesome death that frequently accompanies Ebola
Haemorrhagic Fever has ensured that the disease is etched
deeply into the public imagination. Initially, an Ebola pa-
tient is likely to complain of non-specific symptoms such
as high fever, weakness, diarrhoea, nausea, headache and
vomiting. However, their condition can deteriorate quickly
and dramatically, to include rashes, impaired kidney andCorrespondence: john.kinsman@epiph.umu.se
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orliver function, and in some cases, both internal and exter-
nal bleeding [1]. Those who die do so usually within two
weeks of disease onset, often having exhibited the classical
“deep-set eyes, ghost-like expressionless face, and extreme
lethargy” [2].
Although it is rare, Ebola has a high case fatality rate.
Just 2,306 cases have been reported since the disease
was first recognised in 1976 in Zaire (now the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, or DRC), but 1,527 (66%) of
these individuals died [3]. There remains no specific
therapy, and neither is there a vaccine [4], although. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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promise [5].
Ebola is a zoonotic disease: bats are currently sus-
pected as the most likely reservoir species for the virus
[4]. Outbreaks occur when an individual comes into
contact with an infected animal, with subsequent trans-
mission between humans taking place through direct
contact with the blood and/or secretions of an infected
person. Whole families can therefore be infected when
they are caring for a sick relative, or when preparing a
body for burial. Serious amplification of an epidemic can
also occur in hospitals and clinics if protective clothing
is not worn by health care workers, or if needles and syr-
inges are not sterile [6].
All of the known Ebola outbreaks have originated in
tropical African countries, including Sudan, Zaire/DRC,
the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, and
Uganda. Because of the speed with which Ebola kills,
outbreaks tend to be self-limiting. Indeed, there is evi-
dence that sporadic and unrecognised, or misdiagnosed
outbreaks with low levels of secondary transmission,
may occur relatively frequently [7]. Nonetheless, con-
tainment measures including early hospitalisation and
isolation, disposal of all materials that come into contact
with victims, barrier nursing methods, immediate burial
of the dead, provision of health education messages, and
active surveillance can significantly reduce the number
of infections and deaths [8,9].
The largest Ebola outbreak on record first emerged in
the environs of Lacor Hospital in the northern Ugandan
town of Gulu, in September 2000. Unidentified for some
time, the hospital’s Medical Superintendent reported
an “unusual severe febrile illness” to the Ministry of
Health on October 8. An isolation ward was estab-
lished at the hospital two days later, and the outbreak
was subsequently confirmed as Ebola by a laboratory
at the South African National Institute of Virology on
October 15 [10].
A total of 425 clinical cases were reported during this
outbreak, of whom 224 (53%) died. Three districts were
affected, two in the centre-north of the country, and one
far away in the south west (see Figure 1). Significantly
more females than males were infected (female:male
ratio = 63:37), largely because women generally take on
greater responsibility than men for caring for the sick
and preparing bodies for burial [11,12]. In addition, 31
health workers contracted the virus (7% of the total
number infected), of whom 17 died. Uganda was finally
declared Ebola-free on February 27, 2001 [13].
As with all previous Ebola outbreaks, most of the lit-
erature on this case focused on clinical, epidemiological,
and control issues. Indeed, to date, just a few social sci-
entific Ebola studies have been conducted [12,14,15],
and these have tended to examine how people in theaffected communities perceived and responded to the
outbreaks. Relatively little attention has been given to
events from national, regional, or international perspec-
tives. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to explore,
on a more holistic basis, some of the responses to the
large 2000/2001 Ebola outbreak in Uganda. In so doing,
it reflects on the ways in which three important human
experiences – fear, altruism, and stigma – were felt and
enacted by people throughout Uganda, as well as in
countries many thousands of kilometres away.
Social responses to Ebola
The outbreak of a deadly infectious disease sets in mo-
tion two parallel processes. One of these is epidemio-
logical, in which investigations are undertaken by the
authorities to establish what is the responsible
aetiological agent, who is at risk of infection, through
which activities, and what can be done to reduce that
risk [16]. With this information, an epidemiological pic-
ture of the outbreak is produced, and appropriate con-
tainment and control strategies can then be set in place.
The other process is social. In previous outbreaks,
Ebola had a profound psychological effect on its victims,
the health workers taking care of them, as well as the
affected communities. “Alarm and near panic” were
reported among health workers at Maridi hospital in
Sudan in 1976 during the second ever recorded out-
break, an understandable condition given that 61 of the
hospital’s 154 nursing staff had fallen ill, of whom 33
then died [2]. During the 1995 epidemic in Kikwit, Zaire,
health workers constituted 25% of the 315 Ebola cases
[8], and fear of infection led many of them to quit their
posts. Furthermore, those who bravely stayed at work
subsequently reported feeling stigmatised, because many
people feared that they might act as carriers of the virus
into the wider community. In some cases, neighbours
threw stones at them, while others were chased from
their houses [17].
One way or another, these responses were all predi-
cated on one core factor: fear. Defined as “a feeling of
apprehension or alarm in response to an external source
of danger” [18], and often manifested in these outbreaks
as panic, this fear also contributed to two broad cat-
egories of behaviour that were directed towards the
people and groups who were affected and infected by
Ebola. These response categories were altruism and
stigma.
Different scientific disciplines have taken different
approaches to defining altruism, but perhaps the most
meaningful definition for this study is as an act that
“is or appears to be motivated mainly out of a consid-
eration of another’s needs rather than one’s own” (page
30) [19]. Health workers were the most obviously altruistic
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Figure 1 Map of Uganda showing confirmed Ebola outbreak points, and locations where false alarms were sounded.
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erations also allows some degree of self-interest to be
included in the analysis. In other words, an altruistic act
may be ‘selflessly’ motivated by a humanitarian imperative,
or, otherwise put, by a strongly felt need to act against a
fearsome onslaught of some sort. But a secondary set of
more self-interested motivations may also be identified,
based on a (fear-driven) desire to avoid an unwelcome
material outcome, such as losing a job; or on a wish to
earn some sort of financial or social gain.
Stigma is, of course, an entirely different sort of re-
sponse. In his seminal work on the subject, Goffman
defined a stigmatised individual as one with an “attri-
bute that is deeply discrediting”, and who is thereby
“reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person
to a tainted, discounted one. . . [to the point where] we
believe the person with the stigma is not quite human.
On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimin-
ation, through which we effectively, if often unthink-
ingly, reduce his life chances” (pages 3–5) [20]. This
reduction in life chances is effected through the label-
ling of an individual or a group as different or deviant,
thus producing a state, ultimately founded on fear, of
‘us’ and ‘them’. If ‘they’ have less power than ‘us’, a loss
in status or some other form of discrimination may then
follow [21].Methods
Responses to the outbreak were gauged through the arti-
cles, editorials, cartoons, and letters that were published
in the country’s two main English language daily na-
tional newspapers: the New Vision and the Monitor
(now the Daily Monitor). The New Vision is generally
supportive of the Ugandan government, while the Moni-
tor provides a more independent perspective. Both
sources were treated equally in the analysis, with no
more weight being given to articles from either the New
Vision or the Monitor.
All the relevant pieces from these two sources – be-
tween October 13 2000, when the first reports of a
“strange disease” appeared, and February 27 2001, when
the epidemic was officially declared over – were cut out
on a day-by-day basis as the outbreak unfolded, entered
onto computer, and the originals filed. Following the
principles of thematic analysis, the data were then
moved as appropriate into three a priori codes. These
were based on the multi-level framework used in the
study: (i) responses in the affected communities (i.e. in-
cluding material from all three confirmed outbreak
sites), (ii) responses throughout the country, and (iii)
international level responses. Reviewing the data within
this format, it became clear that three additional codes
would be required for the data coded under ‘responses
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medical fraternity, the government’s response, and con-
troversy over the source of the outbreak. Folders for
these three codes were therefore created, and the rele-
vant material was moved in. The most illustrative anec-
dotes and quotes from each of the six thematic codes
were then extracted, and these were worked into coher-
ent, chronological narratives.
Results
A total of 639 cuttings were taken, 371 (58%) of which
came from the New Vision and 268 (42%) from the
Monitor. This represented a mean of 2.7 and 1.9 cut-
tings per day respectively. The cuttings included 539
articles, 38 letters to the Editor, 34 photographs (inde-
pendent of an accompanying article), 15 editorials and
commentaries and 13 cartoons. There were two peaks in
coverage by the two newspapers. The first came in Week
2, by when the potential seriousness of the outbreak had
been fully recognised – 77 cuttings were taken. The sec-
ond, larger peak was in Week 9, following the death
from Ebola of the man who had first alerted the Ministry
of Health about the outbreak, Dr Matthew Lukwiya,
Medical Superintendent of Lacor Hospital – 102 cut-
tings were taken. Otherwise, there was a consistent and
gradual decline in coverage from Week 2 onwards. Some
of the major events of the outbreak are presented in
Figure 2, in order to give a broad overview of the story
as it unfolded. More of the day-to-day detail is given in
Additional file 1: Annex 1, which lists the headlines of
each of the 88 newspaper articles quoted in the text
below.1 20 40 60
Days after first media r
(Day 1 = Octo
Outbreak first  
















































Figure 2 Timeline showing some of the major events from the UgandBecause it was not always possible to establish from
the reports exactly when a given incident had taken
place, the day numbers below refer to the day on which
the particular stories were published. The first report of
the disease was published in the New Vision on October
13, and this is taken as the reference point, or Day 1.
Responses in the affected communities
Gulu: Epicentre of the outbreak
At the time of the outbreak, Gulu district had been at
the centre of a brutal rebel insurgency by the Lord’s Re-
sistance Army (LRA) for 13 years, ongoing since 1987.
The community’s response to Ebola there should be seen
in this context. Just three days before the Ebola outbreak
was officially announced, for example, 11 people were
killed and over 50 injured in three separate attacks on
Gulu town during Independence Day celebrations. Dur-
ing the outbreak itself, health workers and scouts travel-
ling to affected villages were obliged to travel in Uganda
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) armoured personnel car-
riers in order to avoid the rebels. One report from Day 7
described the visit of a medical team under heavy mili-
tary escort to five patients trapped at their homes. UPDF
protection was not, however, always a guarantee of
safety. One Ebola surveillance scout was killed during an
attack on Day 31.
Gulu bore the brunt of Uganda’s Ebola epidemic, with
393 cases (92% of the total) and 203 deaths [13]. The
Medical Superintendent at Gulu hospital described the
situation as “very wild” on Day 2, adding that two sus-
pected cases had fled the hospital. Four days later, mour-
ners at the funeral of an Ebola victim stripped themselves80 100 120 140
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home with them, to which the Minister of Health
responded, “sometimes the response is extreme, but it
shows that people are taking the message.” Unfortu-
nately, a number of people took the wrong message,
drinking and bathing in ‘Jik’ bleach (which was heavily
promoted throughout the epidemic as an effective disin-
fectant against the virus) “in a desperate attempt to rid
themselves of Ebola”.
Relations between people within the community rap-
idly deteriorated as the infection spread. A reporter in
Rwot-Obillo, one of the first affected villages, described
“people eyeing each other suspiciously, suspecting every-
body else to be a carrier of the killer virus”, while inhabi-
tants of Gulu town were said to be “dispirited,
suspicious and depressed”. People refused to shake
hands, they avoided gatherings, markets and day schools
were closed, and all visits to boarding schools were
banned. One head teacher explained that “the teachers
monitor the children very closely. We tell them to avoid
touching each other. We also instruct them to play
games where there is no body contact”.
On Day 19, Gulu district “erupted in wild shouting,
jumping and running”, as a traditional Acholi ritual was
performed, intended to “exorcise” their land of the virus.
The procedure, known as ryemo gemo, is practiced every
December 31 as a means of cleansing the area of disease
before the New Year begins [12]; but this additional
ryemo gemo ceremony – in which the participants “car-
ried spears and ran around beating saucepans, basins,
calabashes, and jerry cans” – was conducted in late Oc-
tober in the hope that their actions would chase Ebola
across the Nile and away.
Meanwhile, some traditional healers had told people
to tie banana fibres around their wrists as a means of
avoiding Ebola. However, most healers had suspended
curative work in the early stages of the outbreak, since a
number of their colleagues had initially thought that
they would be able to treat Ebola, but they had
contracted the virus during their attempts and suc-
cumbed themselves. The Roman Catholic clergy
responded by visiting many of the affected villages to tell
people “to ignore such witchcraft”. As one priest said
wearily, “because it is a time of fear, people resort to
superstitious practices.”
Stigmatisation rapidly became a major issue, just as it
had done in the Kikwit outbreak of 1995. On Day 5, Dr
Lukwiya of Lacor Hospital said, “Once the names of the
Ebola patients and the dead are made public, society
stigmatises the relatives”. Considerable difficulties were
also faced after the epidemic when trying to resettle the
190 survivors back into their communities, even though
they had fully recovered. Returning home, many found
that fearful neighbours had burned their blankets, clothes,beds, and in some cases even their huts. Others discov-
ered that their spouses had fled, and they were com-
pletely shunned by their neighbours. People refused to
buy from Ebola survivors, so that those who had previ-
ously worked in the markets found themselves without
any means of support. However, a concerted education
programme was launched which eventually ensured that
survivors could once again join the community. As one
woman said, “they burned all my things. I am left with
nothing except the clothes I am wearing now. Even
family members at first feared to mix with me, but I
told them the doctors said it is OK. Now relatives have
started coming back.”
Because traditional burial practices had been a major
factor in initial amplification of the epidemic, the au-
thorities were obliged to take over responsibility for
burying the dead. Trained teams buried 138 of the vic-
tims in one cemetery just outside Gulu town, but the
community as a whole was not able to properly mourn
its dead until the day the epidemic was officially
declared over, February 27 2001. Hundreds of relatives
gathered at the cemetery on that day, many of them
“sitting on the graves, crying and rolling on the ground,
dust and pieces of dry grass stuck to their hair and
clothes, even as the two bishops and a Muslim leader
began prayers.”
Mbarara: A small, controlled outbreak within the army
The Mbarara outbreak struck only five individuals, of
whom four died. Starting on Day 21, it took both the au-
thorities and the public by surprise, since few travellers
move directly between there and Gulu, over 500 km to
the north, which was at that time the only other place
suffering an outbreak. The first case was a UPDF Private
at the barracks in Mbarara town, and the other four
cases were either directly or indirectly connected to the
army, which had the means to impose strict and imme-
diate control measures. As a result, the outbreak
remained within this small closed circle of colleagues, so
community reaction never reached the same pitch as it
did either in Gulu or Masindi (see below for discussion
of events in Masindi). The outbreak was short-lived,
with the fourth and final death taking place on Day 29.
There was, however, some anger over the choice of
burial site for the victims. A Local Councillor said dur-
ing a phone-in radio show that was reported in the
Monitor: “Enough is enough. We reject being the Muni-
cipality’s garbage dump and we will attack the team if
they bring another Ebola body here”. Listeners who sub-
sequently phoned in expressed support for this position,
and some residents of Mbarara Municipality also threa-
tened to attack the University teaching hospital if an-
other victim was buried in their area. The newspapers
never reported how this issue was resolved. Other
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crease in the price of Jik, from 1,500 to 2,000 Uganda
shillings (US$0.85 to US$1.15) per bottle, people avoid-
ing shaking hands and hugging, and poor business at
hotels and kiosks. “I still have almost all the food and
tea we have prepared for breakfast and lunch”, said one
food vendor on Day 23. “We don’t think we shall open
tomorrow”.
Masindi: An angry community response
Just as events were being brought under control in
Mbarara, the epidemic appeared 130 km south of Gulu
town, in Kigumba village, Masindi district. On Day 32,
the death was reported of a woman who had initially
been admitted with abdominal swelling at Lacor Hos-
pital in Gulu, and who had “escaped” from there when
she learned that the hospital was also treating Ebola
patients. Unaccountably infected while at Lacor, she car-
ried the virus home and then infected three of the close
relatives who cared for her when she eventually fell ill.
The four of them all died. As per local custom, their
bodies were kept for three days before burial, and were
ritually and communally washed. A senior member of
the National Ebola Task Force bemoaned the fact that
“they refused to go to hospital, and they did not allow
anyone to go to their homes. Kigumba is a very complex
area,” he added. “It has many nationalities, and it is very
deprived, without facilities and infrastructure.”
A burial team at nearby Kiryandongo hospital was rap-
idly trained by experts brought down from Gulu, and
ten graves were prepared. Because it lacked a reliable
power supply, running water and communication facil-
ities, Kiryandongo was established only as a ‘holding
point’ for suspected cases. Confirmed cases were to be
transferred to the much better equipped Masindi hos-
pital, 50 km away in the district capital. Nonetheless, the
preparations at Kiryandongo prompted 33 “panic-
stricken” patients, admitted with other conditions, to flee
back into the community. Meanwhile, an Ebola isolation
ward with eight beds was established in Masindi, which
required discharging all the patients from a TB ward, in-
cluding several prisoners who were to continue receiving
treatment in their cells.
The death toll gradually grew, and by Day 55, 12
people had died and a further 12 were still admitted.
Serious problems in the community first arose with the
people who lived near to the official Ebola burial site,
three kilometres outside of Masindi town. “Hundreds of
angry villagers” took to the streets on Day 56, and
stormed the district headquarters in protest, forcing offi-
cials to seek an alternative site. Meanwhile, the Ebola
burial team abandoned work due to extreme pressure
from the community, leaving four bodies unburied in
the hospital, which in turn prompted 100 patients inother wards to flee. Residents in some areas of town
began refusing medical workers at Masindi hospital ac-
cess to their own homes, some of which were attacked.
This prompted a press release from the Bunyoro-Kitara
kingdom – which traditionally leads the people of
Masindi – calling for tolerance. “Relatives have turned
against their brothers and sisters who work at Masindi
and Kiryandongo hospitals,” it stated. “A deep division
has been created in the population”.
This statement, and the high level meeting of trad-
itional leaders that followed it, did not, however, bring
an end to the vitriol. The Chairman of the District Task
Force received death threats from people who blamed
him for the death from Ebola of the hospital’s ambulance
driver, who had been infected while transporting patients
from Kiryandongo to Masindi. On Day 60, the Medical
Superintendent of Masindi Hospital decided that he too
was at risk, and he fled with his family to Kampala,
Uganda’s capital city. That same evening, two members
of a relief burial team that had just arrived in Masindi
from Gulu were unceremoniously thrown out of their
hotel and threatened with death.
The Minister of State for Local Government then
stepped in, pointing out that the Penal Code would be
invoked to deal with those who took the law into their
own hands. “All those harassing our dedicated health
workers in the fight against Ebola should be condemned
with the contempt they deserve”, he stated. The govern-
ment also sought to tackle the problem at source, by
strengthening the isolation centre at Kiryandongo so
that it could handle cases that emerged there, while
Masindi hospital would take on cases from elsewhere in
the district. As it happened, the outbreak in Masindi was
almost over by this stage. The last of the 17 deaths
reported in the district occurred just over a week later,
on Day 70.
Responses throughout the country: Panic amid fears of
divine retribution
There were numerous stories from throughout the
country about reaction to the threat of Ebola. Forty-five
false alarms were described in the newspapers (see
Figure 1), arising out of a wide variety of conditions –
dysentery, malaria, cholera, food poisoning, hypertension
(which reportedly caused a nose bleed), gastro-enteritis,
septic abortion, a gun shot wound, menstrual periods,
excessive alcohol consumption, gingivitis, and haemor-
rhoids. The word “panic” accompanied 19 of these
reports. In one case, the suspicious death of a man in a
Kampala hospital sparked off a “stampede” in which
workers and patients fled, while others were wheeled out
of the ward or carried from their beds. Several people
were reportedly injured during another chaotic scene in
Jinja, when nurses “abandoned their desks and threw
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“scampered away” from the suspect individual. Mean-
while, a man in Iganga – 400 km away from the nearest
confirmed case – barricaded himself and all his family
inside their house with sufficient food and water to last
until the outbreak ended, while bank clerks in Mbale
started wearing latex gloves whenever they handled
money.
Even petty criminal activity was affected, with pick-
pockets at a Kampala bus park shunning travellers who
had just arrived either from Masindi or Gulu. Instead of
approaching just anyone who looked like easy prey, the
pickpockets sought first to establish where their target
had come from. “They stand near the buses to make
sure that the person they are going to steal from is not
from Gulu or Masindi,” reported an anonymous source
to the New Vision. Any pickpocket who accidentally
came into contact with a passenger from an affected area
was immediately “excommunicated” by his colleagues.
One boy, for example, who had worked his hand into an
old man’s bag when the latter informed him he was from
Gulu, was “suspended from his group”.
Religion was for many people an important source of
support, explanation and, they hoped, protection. On
Day 29, over 300 Christian churches from throughout
the country converged on a stadium in Kampala to pray
for the end of the Ebola outbreak. Several priests took
the opportunity to emphasise the need for people to fol-
low the scriptures. As one of them said, “whenever there
is famine, an epidemic or endless wars, the Bible says it
is coming from God on a particular people or nation for
sins committed”. This theme of divine retribution was
echoed by the leader of the Muslim Tabliq sect on Day
61, who stated that “whenever man sins, such punish-
ments like the deadly Ebola and AIDS attack mankind”.
Attempts at protection from the virus were also made
in remote Kotido district in the east of the country,
when, on Day 58, Karimojong warriors instigated an
anti-Ebola ritual. According to the head master of a local
school, this was “meant to cast out and cleanse the area
of all bad omens, especially Ebola”. Several goats were
killed and their intestines laid out on the ground in
order to assess and interpret what lay in the future. The
intestines of the first five goats apparently all read “nega-
tive”, which implied “imminent doom” for the Karimo-
jong people. Consequently, 2000 participants in the
ritual were then obliged to step on goat dung and smear
their foreheads with it as “inoculation” against the virus.
Responses of the medical fraternity: Courage, exhaustion,
and the (occasional) abandonment of posts
On Day 9, a senior WHO official described the medical
facilities in Uganda as “outstanding compared to the
classic Ebola situation” – by which he referred to poorlyequipped health centres in such places as rural Sudan or
DRC – but the people working in these facilities were
quickly stretched to breaking point. The intense and sus-
tained concentration required to care safely for Ebola
patients exhausted the health workers, and mistakes
were made. Fourteen of the 22 health workers infected
in Gulu and Lacor Hospitals acquired their infection
after isolation wards and other containment measures
had been established [10].
Lacor Hospital was probably the best equipped and
best manned of all the centres involved, but it was
obliged to take the drastic step of temporarily suspend-
ing all admissions on Day 47, on account of severe phys-
ical and mental fatigue among staff. Ten health workers
had died there by that stage, six in the previous 10 days.
A reporter described the atmosphere as “grim, stressful
and dispiriting”, and threats were circulating of an
imminent strike. The most devastating blow to morale
took place on Day 55, when the Medical Superintendent,
Dr Lukwiya himself, died from Ebola, which had the ef-
fect of “paralysing operations in the hospital”.
Meanwhile at Masindi hospital, a cleaner in the isola-
tion unit and an ambulance driver had fallen ill on Day
54, prompting an outcry among their colleagues who
were reportedly “frightened and demoralised.” On Day
58, Masindi hospital Medical Superintendent com-
plained that some doctors and nurses had suddenly
started demanding for sick or annual leave, while others
were simply not turning up for work. Nurses were com-
plaining of exhaustion, medics were few and over-
worked, and the burial team had abandoned duty after
facing serious stigmatisation from the community.
Finally, there was some good news on Day 63, when it
was announced that 30 clinical officers and nurses from
other parts of the country had volunteered to work with
Ebola patients in Masindi and Gulu to relieve the med-
ical teams there. These volunteers were not, however,
entirely representative of their colleagues nationwide. A
series of interviews had been published on Day 59 quot-
ing nurses from an unaffected part of eastern Uganda, a
number of whom said they would refuse to treat any
Ebola patient. As one stated, “If Ebola breaks out here, I
will not risk my life attending to patients, not after all
those other nurses and a hospital superintendent died. I
will stay away from the hospital. Let me lose my job ra-
ther than losing my life.”
The very particular risks faced by health workers pro-
voked a powerful wave of demands for compensation
and risk allowances. On Day 55 – the day of Dr Luk-
wiya’s death – the Ministry of Health announced that it
was initiating the compensation process for the families
of all health workers who had died from Ebola. This was
not enough for some MPs, however, who called for spe-
cial payments to uninfected health workers. As one said,
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sequently, the Director General of Health Services
announced on Day 64 that staff working with Ebola
would receive between 15,000 and 25,000 Uganda shil-
lings (US$8.60 to US$14.30) extra allowance per day, de-
pending on their job. The President himself also
directed that the families of health workers who died
from Ebola should be paid compensation equivalent to
five months’ salary.
The government’s response: Coordination, surveillance,
and provision of information
Already the day before the Ministry of Health confirmed
the outbreak to be Ebola, the Director General of Health
Services issued a statement calling for special hygienic
precautions when handling patients suspected to be suf-
fering from this “strange” disease, as well as during the
funerals of victims. On Day 4, the Minister of Health
announced plans during a national radio and TV broad-
cast to recruit health scouts throughout Gulu district, to
equip hospitals with medication and protective gear, and
to establish national and district task forces that would
meet daily. He added that people with symptoms should
report at once for treatment, and that the dead should
be buried immediately, but he also stressed that there
was no need for panic. “I assure the people in Uganda
and our international partners that there should be no
cause for alarm, as the steps that government has taken
are adequate to contain this outbreak of Ebola”.
The Ministry of Health co-ordinated the entire na-
tional control operation. This included establishing
a highly sensitive surveillance system, whereby 150
volunteers in Gulu alone followed up 5,600 contacts for
21 days each (the maximum incubation period of the
virus). Other activities involved updating hospital con-
trol measures, establishing safe-burial teams, and com-
munity education. The Ministry also requested WHO
to co-ordinate the international response [10]. Once
the epidemic was brought under control, providing
support for the 600 Ebola orphans and 201 survivors
became a priority. The Ministry distributed 70,000
Uganda Shillings (US$40) to each survivor in order to
replace personal effects destroyed by neighbours while
they were ill. It also co-ordinated the efforts of various
Non Governmental Organisations to assist orphans,
as well as distributing supplies donated by private
organisations.
Providing assurances and accurate information to an
increasingly concerned public was one of the most im-
portant components of the official response. As an opin-
ion column in the Monitor pointed out, “Mass hysteria
is best managed with calmness and scientific facts”. Fre-
quent announcements from the Ministry of Health in all
Uganda’s languages were therefore made over the radio,concerned with prevention and care, the development of
the epidemic, and control measures in all the affected
areas. However, there were cases of senior officials
expressing perhaps unjustified optimism, which demon-
strated the difficulty of finding a balance between being
entirely honest and trying to keep people from becoming
unduly anxious. For example, one individual stated on
Day 8 that “We will get on top of this disease, and in a
week or two, new cases will be history.” When this
clearly did not happen, some people began to suspect
that the government was not telling the truth about the
numbers of infected people, and perhaps more crucially,
whether or not the virus had spread to Kampala. On
Day 58, a member of the National Task Force felt
obliged to address this issue, stating, “I am on the
ground in the whole of Kampala and I am not aware of
any Ebola case. If we hide Ebola, we will kill ourselves.
We are very open.”
Unfortunately, this openness did not in all cases trans-
late to officials wanting to take active responsibility. A
row erupted on Day 68 between Kampala City Council
(KCC) and the Police over who should remove the
corpse of an old man suspected to have died from Ebola.
The man had reportedly been bleeding from the nose,
eyes and mouth before he died at the entrance to one of
Kampala’s taxi parks, and neither group wanted to take
responsibility for the case. The Regional Police Com-
mander said “KCC has a dumper and is equipped to
handle Ebola cases”, while the KCC task force in turn
said that since there was no Ebola in Kampala, it was
the police’s responsibility to take the body away. The
corpse lay in the road for 36 hours before a team hired
by KCC finally picked it up.
In accordance with WHO guidelines [22], no special
restrictions on travel or trade were imposed at any stage
of the epidemic outside the very specific areas where cases
had been reported. However, some local officials requested
people within their jurisdiction not to travel to affected
areas. For example, the Health Secretary of Kalangala Dis-
trict, a sparsely inhabited collection of 83 islands in Lake
Victoria, asked fishermen from Gulu who were living on
the islands not to travel home. “We have no quarrel with
people from Gulu,” he said on Day 32. “We are merely
appealing to everyone doing fish business with that district
to curtail their visits until the situation clears.”
Local officials also played a key role in facilitating the re-
settlement of stigmatised survivors. As Gulu District Dir-
ector of Health Services explained after the epidemic was
over, “The survivors are not infectious, but the communi-
ties took long to accept that. So we had to set up a coun-
selling unit to accompany them into their communities.”
As part of the education process, he personally went
around shaking hands with survivors in order to demon-
strate that they were no longer infectious.
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Scientific and financial support, and some travel
restrictions
From the start, both the government and WHO were
against imposing restrictions on people travelling to or
from Uganda. The WHO disease outbreak co-ordinator
was quoted on Day 5 as saying: “travel restrictions would
be inappropriate because the disease is in a very remote
part of Uganda. It spreads by direct contact with bodily
fluids, not by sitting next to an infected person on a
plane. Cordoning off an area does not work in situations
like this.” The message was repeated numerous times
throughout the epidemic, but it was not always taken up
by other governments, either regionally or further afield.
Neighbouring Kenya responded by sending a “squad of
public health officers” on Day 5 to the Busia border post
to screen travellers coming in from Uganda. The Busia
District Medical Officer said that while they were unable
to test for Ebola, their task was to confine those sus-
pected to be suffering from the disease. The policy was
not consistently implemented, however, and cases were
reported of healthy Ugandans being refused entry to
Kenya, and even deported. For example, none of the
Ugandans on board a cargo boat that docked on Day 8
at Kisumu port on Lake Victoria were allowed to disem-
bark. Furthermore, on Day 44, the Kenyan government
implemented the Epidemic Control Act in order to expel
137 delegates from a meeting in Nairobi of Acholi lea-
ders – half of whom had travelled directly from Gulu –
who had come together to discuss building peace in
northern Uganda. A Ugandan Ministry of Health official
lamented that, “the outbreak should not affect travel out
of Uganda, but we cannot tell Kenya what to do.”
Saudi Arabia took a firm position on the epidemic, but
not until it was effectively over. Around 300 Ugandan
pilgrims had travelled freely to the country while the
epidemic was at its height to perform the Umrah pil-
grimage during Ramadan (in December 2000); but on
Day 98 – just five days before the last of the survivors
was discharged from hospital – a directive was sent from
Riyadh to the Saudi embassy in Kampala, ordering offi-
cials to issue no more visas to Ugandans until further
notice. In spite of a plea from a senior WHO official in
Uganda, the ban stayed in effect throughout the annual
Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, the Hajj, in March 2001.
As a result, while 600 Ugandan pilgrims had undertaken
the pilgrimage in 2000, none managed to do so in 2001.
No travel restrictions were imposed by any European
or North American countries. However, a “polite re-
quest” was observed by a Ugandan traveller in Oslo air-
port, asking anyone from Gulu to identify themselves to
immigration officials. Belgium also obliged airline passen-
gers from Entebbe to indicate on a form where they had
stayed in Uganda, their place of residence in Belgium,their telephone number, and their seat number on the in-
coming plane.
The reaction of the international scientific and medical
community was rapid, with filovirologists from CDC and
WHO, and clinicians from Medicins Sans Frontieres in
the country by Day 6. A team from the South African
National Institute for Virology arrived on Day 41 to
catch and test bats, rats, and other rodents for Ebola in
an attempt to establish the natural host of the virus.
Likewise, the donor community responded quickly,
supplementing by Day 6 the government’s own Ebola
budget of 500 million Uganda shillings (US$285,000)
with an additional US$400,000. More than 20 inter-
national NGOs and government agencies contributed to
combating the epidemic [23], providing expertise, cash,
protective gear, medicines, vehicles, disinfectant, walkie-
talkies, relief food and provisions for survivors. It is diffi-
cult accurately to calculate the value of the donated
goods from press cuttings, but collectively the reports
suggest that it was well in excess of US$3.5 million.
The WHO representative in Uganda commended the
efforts of the donor community, saying, “It was as if
people thought: ‘there is a disaster somewhere. Let us go
and help our brothers’. I have never seen it anywhere
else.” However, the donations were not always given
purely out of selflessness. As the Irish Junior Foreign
Affairs Minister admitted, “this is the sole viable re-
sponse since there is no specific treatment or vaccine for
Ebola. The consequences of an uncontained outbreak
would be horrendous.”
Controversy over the source: Scoring political points
The most politically heated issue of the outbreak con-
cerned where it had come from. Many of the early vic-
tims had lived in Aswa County, near Gulu town, where a
number of UPDF soldiers, returning from the ongoing
war in the DRC, had briefly been settled. As a result,
some Gulu residents thought that the soldiers and their
newly acquired Congolese wives had brought the disease
with them, accusations which were swiftly denied by the
army (see also [12]).
However, in an editorial on Day 5, the Monitor sug-
gested that the government ought to use “people and
institutions who are credible” – in other words, not
members of the UPDF, which itself was being charged
with bringing the virus – for the dissemination of infor-
mation. Otherwise, “they will be suspected of covering
up”. The Monitor argued that a partisan response would
not carry the same weight in the public’s mind as one
issued by, for example, the Ministry of Health. Subse-
quently, the Minister of Health himself announced that
returning UPDF soldiers were not responsible for the
outbreak, adding “if any soldier died of Ebola, we would
tell you.”
Kinsman Globalization and Health 2012, 8:15 Page 10 of 12
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/8/1/15The official position seemed to be vindicated on Day
9, when virologists from the Centres for Disease Control
(CDC) announced that they had identified the culpable
strain as the Ebola-Sudan variety – as opposed to the
other major strain, Ebola-Zaire – which had last been
recorded in Nzara, southern Sudan, in 1979. However,
according to an opinion column in the Monitor, the an-
nouncement was immediately seized upon by “some
chaps in government [who] saw this as a gold mine to
deliver a political statement”: that LRA rebels based in
Sudan – and not the UPDF in the DRC – must therefore
have brought the virus. The idea was supported by “un-
confirmed” but highly suggestive reports in the New Vi-
sion that the rebels had been trading in the brains of
baboons and monkeys. On that very same day, however,
the rebels themselves released 40 people they had re-
cently abducted in Gulu, apparently because they were
afraid of catching Ebola. Furthermore, on Day 19, it was
reported that they had abandoned one of their transit
routes through one of the main Ebola-hit areas.
The actual source of the outbreak will, in all likeli-
hood, never be known. As one of the WHO Ebola spe-
cialists explained, central Africa is “endemic for
filoviruses. . . [and] it’s not inconceivable that there has
been an Ebola virus in Uganda for some time”. Nonethe-
less, when the epidemic was finally declared over and
the lessons learned were being discussed and analysed, a
Monitor editorial took the opportunity to argue that
“the best thing is to avoid a situation where diseases are
brought by soldiers returning from foreign military
adventures, rebels or fleeing refugees. We should have
sound politics at home so that we live in peace with our
neighbours”.
Discussion
This paper presents an analysis of responses to a major
Ebola outbreak, from the perspectives of the afflicted
communities, from Uganda as a whole, as well as from
the region and further afield internationally. Previous so-
cial science papers have examined experiences from
within Ebola-afflicted communities [12,14,15], but
events far from the outbreak itself have not been widely
reported upon. It is important that such events –
including false alarms, the highly politicised debate
about the source of the virus, as well as deportations
from neighbouring countries are also recognised as part
of the broader response.
The over-riding theme of the Uganda Ebola outbreak of
2000/2001 – the largest on record – was fear. This fear
led, among many other actions, to people seeking solace
in superstitious beliefs (whether traditional, Christian,
or Muslim); to health workers quitting their posts;
to panic-stricken patients fleeing their hospital beds;
and, on at least one occasion, to official authoritiesbattling with each other to avoid picking up a sus-
pected Ebola corpse. These very direct attempts at self-
preservation were based either on establishing as much
physical distance as possible between the actor and the
perceived location of the virus, or on the hope that
some higher power might intervene to ensure contin-
ued good health. They did not, however, involve any
sort of direct social interactions with people or groups
who were infected or affected by Ebola. The data pre-
sented in this paper suggest that such social interac-
tions were grounded in either altruism or stigma.
Altruism
Taking the definition of altruism given earlier – an act
that “is or appears to be motivated mainly out of a con-
sideration of another’s needs rather than one’s own”
(page 30) [19] – a combination of altruistic responses
can be seen, ranging from the entirely selfless to those
with at least a degree of self-interest. The most selfless
actors in this outbreak were clearly those who had, and
who knew they had, the most to lose – in the form of
their lives. These were the health workers, the ambu-
lance drivers, and the burial teams, although even in
these cases many would have acted out of a degree of
self-interest, in the sense that they possibly stood to lose
their jobs should they have defaulted from work. Simi-
larly, the donor community, who flooded the country
with technical and financial assistance, did so out an ap-
parently genuine desire to assist, a wish to “help our
brothers”; but this too was coupled with a quite expli-
citly stated concern to prevent the outbreak from spil-
ling over the borders to neighbouring countries and
beyond. In this case, the mixing between humanitarian-
ism and self-protection was premised around the
principle that ‘your problem is my problem’. It was also
easy, politically, to justify expenditure and effort in these
altruistic acts, since, as the Irish Minister explained, the
consequences of an uncontained outbreak would have
been “horrendous”.
Stigma
The second core social response was stigma, based on a
fear of people who were either infected or affected. This
stigma manifested itself differently, both qualitatively
and quantitatively, according to where it was enacted. At
the local level, ‘they’ were the victims themselves, the
survivors, orphans and other relatives, health workers,
and burial teams; while ‘we’ could be seen as the unin-
fected and untouched remainder of the community. The
stigma experienced at this level was the most damaging,
including cases of people’s huts and belongings being
burned; or that experienced by the health workers who,
through acting heroically against the fearsome disease,
became, in the community’s eyes, the very thing that
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severe effects on their subsequent “life chances” (as
theorised by Goffman [20]).
Nationally, ‘they’ were people from Gulu, Masindi and
Mbarara, while ‘we’ were, once again, the uninfected and
untouched remainder of the country; and internationally,
‘they’ were all Ugandan nationals, and ‘we’ were everyone
else in the world. The stigma experienced at these
‘higher’ levels was certainly inconvenient for those who
suffered it, including deportation (for example, from
Kenya) and other restrictions on movement; but, unlike
at the local level, it would probably not have led to any
long term impact on the “life chances” of those who had
been stigmatised.
Methodological reflections
The only viable way of studying responses from around
the world to an outbreak of Ebola, or indeed of any other
virulent infectious disease, is to rely on secondary data
sources. It is simply not possible to be present wherever
events related to or caused by the outbreak are happening;
and the methodological challenges inherent within this
must therefore be examined.
This study has used reports from two quite different
newspapers as data sources. As stated in the Methods
section above, it was not seen as important which news-
paper reported on any given story; both were accorded
the same ‘weight’ when choosing which stories or quotes
to include in the text. This equality is reflected in the
relative proportions of quotes from the two newspapers
that are included in the text above: 52 (59%) came from
the New Vision, and 36 (41%) came from the Monitor
(see Additional file 1: Annex 1). These proportions are
almost identical to those of the total number of cuttings
taken, of which 371 (58%) came from the New Vision
and 268 (42%) came from the Monitor. Thus, there is lit-
tle likelihood of bias caused by over- or under-
representation of either newspaper.
A second point concerns the need to rely on other peo-
ple’s representations of events, which means that there
has been no means of verifying what was written unless a
given story was reported on by both the New Vision and
the Monitor. However, because the articles were produced
by many different reporters from the two newspapers, and
since they were, for the most part, sober and restrained in
tone, it is likely that any bias in perspective would have
been diluted. Thus, while this article cannot claim to
present an objective depiction of “what really happened”
during this outbreak, I am confident that it nonetheless
gives a broadly accurate picture of some of the key events.
Lessons for the future: The importance of openness
With 11 Ebola outbreaks and 348 recorded deaths recorded
during the 1990s, and 11 outbreaks causing 725 recordeddeaths in the years since 2000 [3], Ebola remains as an on-
going, but, in the grand scheme, relatively minor threat to
global health. Nonetheless, it is clear from the Ugandan ex-
perience of 2000/2001 that the responses to an outbreak
can be very dramatic, and perhaps disproportionate to the
actual danger presented. Indeed, in some cases, the
responses during this outbreak actively inhibited control
and containment measures. An important objective for any
future outbreak control strategy must be to prevent exces-
sive fear, which, it is expected, would reduce stigma and
other negative outcomes while simultaneously encouraging
more altruistic responses.
With regards the provision of public information, it is
notable that many of the Ugandan Ministry of Health offi-
cials who worked on the 2000/2001 outbreak (for example,
Okware et al. [13]; and Lamunu et al. [24]) had years of ex-
perience behind them working with AIDS. Thus they were
intimately acquainted with the country’s ‘open’AIDS policy,
initiated in the mid-late 1980s, when elected officials from
national level all the way down to village level were
required by presidential decree to bring AIDS into their dis-
cussions at every public meeting [25]. This long-standing
official culture of openness clearly affected the way they
then dealt with the Ebola outbreak, since they well under-
stood the potential implications if the public sensed that
they were hiding or downplaying the full extent of the out-
break. As one of them quoted above explained, “If we hide
Ebola, we will kill ourselves. We are very open.”
Conclusions
Given the extent of the fear and stigma that prevailed
throughout the course of the 2000/2001 Ugandan Ebola
outbreak, the value of being open in the provision of pub-
lic information during any future outbreak anywhere in
the world – and, critically, of being seen to be open – can-
not be overstated.
This principle of openness, learned over the long course
of the Ugandan AIDS epidemic, helped in the country’s
2000/2001 Ebola outbreak to keep an occasionally panicky
populace from excessive over-reaction, and thereby con-
tributed to containing the virus, as well as to reducing
stigma and other negative consequences. Countries suffer-
ing an Ebola outbreak in the future may well benefit in
their attempts to combat the disease by taking on board
this important lesson from the Ugandan experience.
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